



Political culture in Ethiopia: A balance sheet  
of post-1991 ethnically based federalism 
 
 
The political transition in Ethiopia in 1991 came 
at a time when there were high hopes among 
Africans, civil-society organizations, the interna-
tional community and scholars for processes of 
democratisation. The process of political change 
in Ethiopia has been a subject of research at the 
African Studies Centre (ASC) since the early 
1990s as part of a broader project on transfor-
mations in politics and society in Africa and how 
they relate to the global order. 
 
In the past 20 years Africa has seen momentous 
changes, and various countries have made sig-
nificant progress in achieving political stability 
(e.g. Mali, Ghana and Senegal). However, there 
has been neither a continent-wide democratic 
breakthrough nor an institutionalisation of de-
mocracy and the rule of law, and zones of major 
conflict and authoritarianism still remain. The 
Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, is one of 
them. Ethiopia has a long tradition of indigenous 
state formation and a relatively strong state 
structure. The Mengistu dictatorship (the Derg) 
was militarily defeated in May 1991 by the insur-
gent Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), an 
ethno-regional movement from the northern re-
gion of Tigray, with the assistance of the Eritre-
an People’s Liberation Front, and has been in 
power ever since as the dominant partner in the 
ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democ-
ratic Front (EPRDP). It announced a process of 
liberalization, democratisation, proclaimed re-
spect for ethnic and human rights, and socio-
economic reforms, but has not yet delivered on 
its promises. While doubts about the new politi-
cal model were voiced at the time,1 many were 
too optimistic about the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Somalia) to question the long-term po-
licies and nature of the new regime. Today, most 
observers are reporting a slide towards auto-
cratic rule, with political opponents being sup-
pressed and growing restrictions on the press 
and social and educational freedoms.  
 
Since the early 1990s there has been a great 
deal of donor-driven economic growth in Ethio-
                                                 
1 See also the documentary Imperfect Journey that 
was produced for the BBC in 1994 by the acclaimed 
US-Ethiopian filmmaker Haile Gerima. 
pia, with investments in infrastructure, market 
development and direct foreign investment in, 
for example, the flower sector, agrarian food 
export enterprises and mineral exploration. The 
level of growth in per capita GDP is sufficiently 
high for most donor countries to ignore the re-
strictions on political and human rights, on 
equality before the law, and the repression. 
Accountable governance, transparency, respect 
for (property) rights, access to land, and reform 
of the justice system have lagged behind, and 
the dramatic level of violence that has weighed 
on the country since the days of the Mengistu 
regime is still an ominous subtext in public life. 
 
 
New infrastructure: The Gohatsion Bridge (2008) 
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The ASC’s research project has considered va-
rious aspects of the process of political change 
in Ethiopia since 1991: legal-constitutional is-
sues, political strategies, governance tactics, 
conflict and repression, party formation, domi-
nant-party rule, and the effects of ethnic feder-
alism at the local level.  
 
Since 1994 Ethiopia has been a federal democ-
ratic republic that politically recognizes ethnic 
identities. The TPLF saw the nationalities ques-
tion (and not the issue of class) as the root 
cause of Ethiopia’s political and economic prob-
lems in 1991 and took it as the basis of a new 
federal constitution that was ratified in Decem-
ber 1994. Ethnic identity or ‘nationality’ was put 
above civic Ethiopian identity, and sovereignty 
was not placed in the Ethiopian people but in the 
various nations, nationalities and peoples. This 
innovative but obfuscating formula left the fed-
eral government in control of a largely non-ne-
gotiated political order. The concept of ethnic 




identity (in the dominant local language of Am-
haric: behereseb) was based on a combination 
of cultural, territorial and linguistic criteria that 
were largely inspired by Stalin’s Marxist defini-
tion of nationalities. While in political terms it 
drew attention to ethnic rights, the premise of 
this new politics has had a tense relationship 
with individual, civic democratic rights. This ten-
sion is still present, as is evident from the nume-
rous recent clashes and conflicts in the country. 
 
The political changes in Ethiopia since 1991 
have been well studied and it is notable that few, 
if any, scholars are positive about Ethiopia’s un-
reconstructed ethnic model. The TPLF/EPRDF, 
under the leadership of the same prime minister 
since 1991 and who is in effect the real power 
holder, has clung to a post-Marxist-centrist poli-
tical model that is uncomfortable with the idea of 
an opposition, despite legally recognizing the 
existence of other parties. Elections were held in 
1992, 1995, 2000 and 2005 but were, according 
to election observers, procedurally biased in 
favour of the ruling party, which is a de facto 
dominant party and does not entertain the idea 
of sharing power. During election campaigns it 
has been able to use the state apparatus and 
the police and the army to convince people to 
vote the ‘right way’.  
 
 
Map of Ethiopia with the post-1991 ethno regions 
(killils). Source: UNDP 
[Source: www.reliefweb.int/mapc/afr_ne/cnt/eth/ethzones.gif] 
 
No negotiated settlement or restructuring of the 
authoritarian political arena in Ethiopia has yet 
been successful. Ethnic divisiveness is a ten-
dency that is seemingly built into the system. 
Ethiopia’s politics are complex and highly con-
troversial, with few possibilities for reasoned 
compromise or issue-directed policies. The 
country is prone to conflict and has recently 
 
 





seen two major regional wars (with Eritrea in 
1998-2000 and Somalia from 2006-2008), nu-
merous interventions against alleged domestic 
opponents and some smaller insurgent forces. A 
military campaign to suppress the radical Oga-
den National Liberation Front (ONLF) in the 
eastern Ogaden (Somali) region after a 2007 as-
sault on personnel at an oil-drilling site is still on-
going in 2010. 
 
Despite increased economic investment and re-
mittances, migrant communities outside Ethiopia 
are almost universally critical of Ethiopian state 
politics, sometimes vehemently and unreason-
ably so, but their criticism is having little impact. 
However, partnerships between the Ethiopian 
state and the diaspora have great potential, in 
the political sense too. 
 
International donor countries continue to infuse 
Ethiopia with development aid to such an extent 
that they have created a serious dependency 
syndrome as well as a vital lifeline for the re-
gime. However the limited influence they are 
able to wield on domestic politics is remarkable. 
Democracy and the rule of law are rhetorically 
stated as important, as criteria to measure per-
formance against and a condition for continued 
aid, but they are not insisted upon. This perhaps 
reflects the dilemma of the international commu-
nity. In addition, Ethiopia can now play the ever-
increasing Chinese role (and its financial re-
sources) off against the western powers that 
were historically the country’s partners. China is 
seen by the Ethiopian leadership as a political 
model with its one central dominant party that 
co-opts politics, its single ideology, and tactics 
such as strategically suppressing opposition 
groups, restricting press freedom, NGO activities 
and civil society, and trying opponents on al 
 










leged crimes with evidence based on false wit-
ness statements.  
 
The huge business interests that the ruling party 
has amassed in Ethiopia are of vital importance 
to it. Companies nationalized by the previous 
regime have been privatised while the TPLF/ 
EPRDF and its supporters have in effect taken 
over all the key sectors of the economy. Privati-
sation ‘in favour of’ the ruling party has led to 
consistent complaints of unfair competition by 
businessmen of a different political background. 
In addition, all land in Ethiopia is still state-
owned (already since 1975) and not privately or 
communally held. This does not make sense 
economically in times of perpetual food short-
ages as it leads to land insecurity, a lack of 
agricultural dynamics and frequent local con-
flicts, but is being continued for reasons of politi-
cal control.  
 
When considering its governance ideology, the 
ruling party appears to have a ‘religious’ con-
ception of politics, seeing it as ontological and in 
a class by itself, a way that cannot be enter-
tained in any other form than its own, and one 
rooted in an ideology called ‘revolutionary de-
mocracy’. This is opposed to liberal democracy, 
which is seen by the dominant party leadership 
as unsuited to a developing country like Ethio-
pia, although the underlying reason might be to 
help it to cling to power. Elections are thus 
unlikely ever to result in defeat for the ruling 
party. The TPLF/EPRDF sees itself as a van-
guard party that is invincible and incapable of 
being wrong. This view and the party’s policies 
have led to reinforced autocratic rule and intimi-
dation, a stifling of general freedoms and armed 
suppression. For example, after the 2005 par-
liamentary elections, there was a bloodbath, 
which deeply shocked the nation, when 193 
civilians were killed by police and special army 
units on the streets of Addis Ababa. The gov-
ernment has created an atmosphere of insecu-
rity and fear among the general public who, in 
turn, have little trust in their leaders. There is 
insufficient space for independent initiative, dis-
sent and debate. While election campaigns by 
opposition parties are allowed to be organized, 
for example in the run-up to parliamentary elec-
tions in May 2010, the intimidating presence of 
the state in the form of politicians, the police, the 
secret forces and party cadres is thwarting much 
of their scope for action and freedom.  
 
The recognized opposition parties have a 
peaceful agenda for political change but their 
leaders are regularly harassed, threatened, ban-
ned, exiled and imprisoned. (For example, Ms 
Birtukan Mideqsa, the leader of the opposition 
UDF, was sent to prison for life in 2009.) The 
Ethiopian people have become used to the sup-
pressive arm of the state and are deeply scep-
tical of democratic change. The general conclu-
sion of research into the democratic potential of 
Ethiopian politics since 1991 can therefore only 
be pessimistic. The country’s domestic stability 
is fragile and wrought with underlying tensions, 








A core finding of the ASC’s research is that 
these problems directly relate to the problematic 
basis of the current political system, which could 
benefit from change instead of further rigidifica-




tion. Less emphasis on ethnic division and more 
emphasis on coalition building would seem ad-
visable. Despite the absence of past colonial 
traumas, a strong state heritage and a relatively 
well-trained and capable bureaucracy, Ethiopia’s 
political record is, unfortunately, not very differ-
ent from that of the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
While there is still potential, many of the chan-
ces the country has had since 1991 to break 
with its violent past and build new democratic 
coalitions have been missed.  
Further research into the benefits and limitations 
of ethnically based federalism in the light of 
democratic theory, federalism, good-governance 
ideologies, neo-patrimonialism, ethnicity and 
conflict studies is needed. Additional information 
and theoretical reflections on Ethiopia’s recent 
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